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Undignified Rights: The Importance of a basis in Human 
Dignity for the Possession of Rights in the United Kingdom  
 
Benedict Douglas* 
 
[2015] Public Law 241 
 
Abstract 
 
The question of the basis on which human rights are possessed is of fundamental importance 
in determining the nature of the rights. The leading UN rights treaties and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) have prominently recognised human rights as deriving from the 
possession of dignity. In contrast, the Human Rights Act 1998 is silent upon this question, 
and the domestic courts have overwhelmingly failed to recognise the incorporated 
Convention rights as having a fundamental basis grounding their possession, going beyond 
the ordinary authority of proper statutory enactment. This position is a manifestation and 
continuation of the historical positivist conception of rights in the UK, dating back to the 
rights critiques of Bentham and Burke. I argue that this lack of understanding of the moral 
basis on which human rights are possessed, as well as being inconstant with the UN and 
ECtHR approaches to rights, has contributed to the lack of rights ownership recognised by 
the Commission on a Bill of Rights. I argue that one means which can help to redress this is 
for the domestic courts or a new bill of rights to recognise rights, their possession, 
interpretation and application, as universally and inalienably justified by human dignity. 
Keywords: Bill of Rights – Human Rights Act 1998 – Preambular Statements – Judicial 
Interpretation – Dignity – Rights Metaphysics  
 
Introduction 
 
The importance of the fundamental basis justifying the possession and protection of human 
rights, is indicated by the prominent position given to it in the preambles of rights documents. 
This basis is recognised by the most influential UN rights documents as the dignity of the 
individual.  
In marked contrast to this, the protection of human rights in the UK lacks such a 
fundamental justificatory basis, and its importance in establishing a non-positivist foundation 
for rights ownership is unrecognised. Domestic human rights possession is grounded in 17
th
 
century ideas of legal personhood. There is no mention of dignity or other foundational 
principles in the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), and recognition of the universal and 
inalienable possession of the Convention rights such a basis brings is very rare in domestic 
case law. This absence is at least partially rooted in the historical context of rights protection 
in the UK and the related scepticism of Edmund Burke and Jeremy Bentham, whose ideas 
continue to shape the UK legal system’s conception of rights. This lack of a fundamental 
justification for rights possession creates a positivist space, where the absence of the 
recognition of the universal and inalienable possession of rights strengthens the position of 
2 
 
other criticism of the HRA, contributing to the poor public ownership and acceptance of 
rights identified by the Commission on a Bill of Rights.
1
  
I argue here that a means by which the true nature of human rights as distinct from other 
laws can be recognised, and the increased ownership of rights furthered, is for the domestic 
courts and any future bill of rights to acknowledge the fundamental justificatory basis for the 
Convention rights, as universally and inalienably attaching to human dignity. This change in 
justification is supported by the recognition of this basis within the foremost rights 
documents of which the UK is a signatory and the constitutional experiences of other states, 
and show to be possible by the judgments of Baroness Hale and Lord Justice Munby. This 
approach does not involve the substantive interpretive use of a conception of dignity nor 
affect the substance of judgments under the HRA, and thus circumvents the many past cogent 
criticisms of the judicial application of the principle of dignity.  
We have a rights document, but without recognising dignity as the justificatory 
foundation for the rights, the domestic legal understanding of rights remains positivist and 
cannot coherently address and justify the acceptance and ownership of human rights. The 
HRA is a rights document without a proper foundation and, if the importance of the basis of 
rights is not recognised, the position of those rights will remain precarious. 
 
Importance of the Question of the Basis of Rights 
 
The question of the basis for the possession of human rights is of pivotal importance because 
it defines the nature of the rights, by stating the basis on which they are held and therefore 
who can claim their protection. These foundation defining issues, of who has human rights 
and why they have those rights, are the legal and practical manifestations of the authoritative 
and distributive questions which any basis of rights must answer.
2
 A statement of who has 
rights, their distribution, presupposes and thus includes a statement of why persons have 
rights, the authority that requires they be respected. For a coherently morally justified 
conception and application of human rights, it is necessary to go beyond the question of their 
legal origins and engage with the question of the basis of rights at a moral level. Without such 
a deeper basis human rights laws can only be positivist norms, claiming to be no different 
morally from any other law, gaining all their authority through the procedural legality of their 
enactment. 
The foremost rights treaties openly accept the necessity of recognising and addressing 
the question of the basis and beneficiaries of rights possession, if the rights are to be more 
than positivist norms upon stilts. The major United Nations (UN) rights documents thus claim 
rights universally and inalienably attach to those possessing the characteristic of dignity. The 
most influential modern human rights document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 (UDHR) therefore states as its preambular premise that the  
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.” 
The universality of rights stated in their possession by “all members of the human family,” 
encapsulates the recognition that all human rights are possessed by all humans who have the 
fundamental characteristics which give rise to the rights, regardless of what other 
                                                 
* I am very grateful for the guiding comments of the anonymous reviewer and the help and advice of Chris 
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characteristics they possess, and that they are not merely legal rights given by national or 
international law, but rather attach to persons regardless of laws. This is similarly emphasised 
in the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) commitment to “securing the 
universal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights”.3  
The inherent characteristic of worth by virtue of which rights are universally possessed is 
labelled “dignity.”4 To this the possession of human rights is stated to be “inalienable.”5 This 
basis in dignity thus performs a “founding function,” conceptualising the recognition that 
there is a characteristic which unites mankind and the existence of which is not dependant on 
its recognition by states.
6
 It is this base in dignity which justifies and demands the recognition 
of and respect for their rights irrespective of national laws,
7
 answering the authoritative and 
distributive questions.  
Although the UDHR and other UN rights documents prominently invoke the possession 
of dignity as the moral basis to which human rights attach, their drafters deliberately 
refrained from giving it a definition. The UDHR’s creators did so to ensure the agreement to 
the document amongst states with different ideologies, who attribute the existence of rights to 
different foundations.
8
 The necessity and success of this strategy is apparent from 
discrepancies in the ratifications of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Both contain an identical 
preambular reference to dignity, yet the USA ratified only the ICCPR and China only the 
ICESCR. Although each state has a different conception of rights possession and, therefore, 
the rights that should be recognised,
9
 both agreed to the same statement of rights as based in 
dignity. 
Whilst the HRA seeks to give effect to the ECHR,
10
 the Convention preamble states the 
intention of enabling the enforcement of the UDHR, but makes no explicit reference to 
dignity or other deeper principled bases. The reason for this absence is not explained in the 
preparatory materials.
11
 Jochen Frowein attributes it to the view that dignity was too wide a 
concept.
12
 Although this breadth of scope was precisely the reason for its use in other treaties, 
the desire to create the first judicially enforceable legally binding human rights treaty could 
indeed have led the drafters to prefer more specific language. Alternately, it may have been 
deemed unnecessary, given the claim to ancestry in the UDHR which gives dignity a 
prominent position. However, in spite of this textual absence, the ECtHR found it necessary 
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to recognise the basis in dignity of the possession of Convention rights, stating in Pretty v 
United Kingdom that the protection of dignity as the “very essence” of the Convention.13  
Engagement with and recognition of a deeper basis of rights is thus key for their 
justification as distinct from that of ordinary positivist legal norms. The importance of the 
basis on which rights are held has been recognised within the leading rights documents to 
which the UK is a member, although they have not given a single clear definition of the basis. 
However, the argument I will make here is not for a particular substantive basis of rights or 
conception of dignity to be applied interpretively by the courts to give substance to the 
Convention rights. Rather, it is that British rights protection must recognise and invoke a 
fundamental basis underpinning rights as the UDHR and ECtHR have done, if their very 
existence, interpretation and application are to be coherently justified in a non-positivist 
manner, and the universal and inalienable possession of the Convention rights in the UK is to 
be understood and accepted. 
The Commission on a Bill of Rights’ main reason for calling for a new UK rights 
document to replace the HRA was that lack of ownership of rights in the UK. The 
Commission’s report argued that there was a lack of “public understanding” of, and 
acceptance of the legitimacy of, human rights in Britain.
14
 Mark Elliot describes this as a lack 
of understanding of the universally applicable nature of human rights.
15
 The failure of the 
HRA, and the judicial application of it, to acknowledge and engage with the authoritative and 
distributive questions of the grounds on which rights are possessed, contribute to this lack of 
ownership at a fundamental level. With a lack of a statements to create an understanding of 
the basis on which we possess rights, a lack of ownership naturally follows. 
 
The British Basis of Rights: The Lack of Principled Justification 
for Rights in the UK 
 
Unlike the UN rights documents, the HRA contains no preambular statement or claim that its 
rights are grounded in underlying principles such as dignity. Likewise, neither of the 
documents in which the Labour party proposed the Act invoke the universal and inherent 
nature of human rights as a justifying basis for their incorporation or protection.
16
 The 
motivations stated in these documents, and at the second readings in the Houses of Commons 
and Lords, were the more practical aims of speeding redress for breeches of rights, bypassing 
Strasbourg, and enabling domestic courts to contribute to the Convention jurisprudence.
17
 
The Labour party saw the Act as a part of their wider constitutional changes,
18
 which would 
create a “culture of rights”19 and achieve a protection for citizens which went beyond that of 
civil liberties.
20
 However, in all these statements there was no recognition that incorporation, 
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that a shift from liberties to rights, which would meet “the democratic need of individuals and 
minorities to have their human rights secured,”21 was at a deeper level justified by the 
universal and inalienable attachment of human rights to the dignity of the individual. The 
discussion of “British citizen’s” rights22 rather than humans’ rights is a stark synthesis of this. 
Given the absence of dignity or other principled foundations for rights in the ECHR, and 
as the HRA sought only to give “further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
European Convention,”23 it is unsurprising the Act contains no principled preamble. 
However, this absence of dignity, or any other principled statement of the basis of the 
substantive rights, puts the HRA in marked contrast with the UN scheme of rights protection, 
ECtHR recognition of a dignity basis and some other countries’ rights documents. It leaves 
the HRA without a statement of a non-positivist answer to the distributive and authoritative 
questions, without a more fundamental basis for the rights than the ordinary rules of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
This lack of claim to foundational principles of the universal and inalienable possession 
of rights, similar to those found in the pivotal UDHR is not a mere textual omission, it is a 
product of the environment of the HRA’s creation. It is both symptomatic of, and now 
contributes to, the lack of a wide recognition of a fundamental basis for the possession of 
human rights within the UK. The origin of the international recognition of the non-positivist 
basis of rights, as universally and inalienably possessed, is revealed by a comparative 
analysis of both modern and earlier history of rights recognition to be a response designed to 
protect against the repetition of past state tyranny. The basis of rights in dignity in the UDHR, 
and the Declaration as a whole, is an attempt to avert a repetition of the violations of the 
WWII by creating a universal standard against which all states’ actions can be judged, 
regardless of their national laws. This is a continuation of a conception of rights which can be 
seen in the earliest modern rights documents. When contrasted with the context of rights 
statements in the United States and France, their constitutional history offers a persuasive 
explanation for the HRA’s lack of principle based recognition of the universality and 
inalienability of rights.  
The early great statements of rights were created in response to oppressive laws and 
regimes, and the drafters sought in their constitutions to state the rights they claimed and 
recognised as distinct from other law. This they did by giving them a basis in deeper 
principles which in turn justified the special position of the rights as constitutional norms 
safeguarded from easy amendment. The United States’ Declaration of Independence 1776 
lists the grievances against the British Crown which led the colonies to revolt. To justify their 
revolution they relied upon principles of “the laws of nature and of nature’s God,” stating that 
these entailed “certain unalienable rights, [including] life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness,” elaborated subsequently in the Constitution.24 The French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789 similarly stated the protection of “inalienable and sacred 
rights of man” based on “simple and incontrovertible principles…under the auspices of the 
Supreme Being.” In these first documents of the modern rights movement, rights were 
perceived and claimed from the outset to be possessed on a basis distinct from and more 
fundamental than that of ordinary law and governance. 
The HRA thankfully did not emerge out of a mass rights violation. However, the 
consequence of this lack of a revolutionary basis, or accompanying statement of underlying 
principles, is that HRA has become the unintended victim of the historical rights critiques of 
Edmund Burke and Jeremy Bentham, which have inoculated Britain against the acceptance of 
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22
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non-positivist rights. Crucially, however, the aspects of the 18
th
 century French and American 
rights documents they criticised, their derivation of rights from the distinct and deeper 
fundamental principled basis, are the aspects that give those rights their special status and 
force, and their absence within UK rights protection contributes to the domestic lack of 
acceptance and ownership of human rights. 
Bentham rejected the view that rights derive from moral principles,
 
arguing they are 
norms like any other, created and granted by the state to the individual.
25
 This conception of 
rights can be seen to have been adopted within the drafting of the HRA, giving a truth to his 
views that they do not have not have when applied to other rights documents which invoke a 
deeper moral basis such as dignity. As a consequence of the absence of such a basis the “Act” 
element has predominated over the nature of the substantive “Human Rights” in their 
characterisation, allowing a perception that it and the rights are no different from other 
domestic laws.   
Similarly, Burke’s criticisms in his Reflections on the Revolution in France have been 
proved true by the lack of a deeper basis within the HRA. Where Bentham criticised moral 
rights as vapid nonsense, Burke feared their power. He claimed that in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man the French had “wrought under-ground a mine that will blow up…all 
examples of antiquity, all precedents, charters, and acts of parliament.”26 Rights based in 
metaphysics which broke with the continuity of the previous law, Burke argued, would 
destroy the structure of society and established rights.
27
 By depriving the Convention rights 
of a deeper basis, the HRA has thus curtailed their power to effect a change within the law, to 
be “metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense 
medium.”28 The statements by some members of the judiciary, that that the same decision 
would have been reached under the Common Law as under the HRA,
29
 are echoes of the 
fears that haunted Burke. These statements can also be depicted as desiring to create a 
narrative of continuity and coherence between the Convention rights and common law.
30
 
However, this downplays the fundamental shift in legal norms the incorporation of the 
universal and inalienable Convention rights constituted, continuing the pre-HRA reluctance 
of some members of the judiciary to allow the Convention rights to change the Common 
Law.
31
 
In consequence of this lack of a deeper basis, individuals and judges have been allowed 
to perceive the HRA incorporated rights to be what Bentham thought all statements of rights 
to be, norms like any other created and granted by the state to the individual. Although there 
has been a perception by the courts that the HRA is a special constitutional statute by virtue 
of its statement of “fundamental constitutional rights,”32 the fundamental basis of human 
                                                 
25
 J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Boweing (ed) (Edinburgh: William Tait 1843), Vol. III, pp.160 
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30
 Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534 at 551; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131; and Prolife Alliance at [33]. 
31
 G. Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed Horizontal Effect After Campbell’ in H. Fenwick and others (eds) Judicial 
Rreasoning Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), pp.144-145; e.g. 
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32
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rights remains unrecognised. Without a principled basis there is no deeper justification for 
regarding the rights to be unlike any other statute granted entitlement. A 2011 YouGov poll 
shows that 64 per cent of those questioned did not recognise the inalienability of rights, 
agreeing that not everyone should have their human rights protected when they have broken 
the law.
33
 Within this context domestic hostility to human rights is understandable; without 
this deeper non-positivist basis for rights possession, when unpopular minorities such as 
prisoners or immigrants have their rights vindicated the question is asked “why are we giving 
rights to them?”  
The lack of ownership of rights identified by the Bill of Rights Commission may have 
several sources, political manoeuvring and Eurosceptisism have led to focus on their 
Britishness. But the lack of recognition of the Convention rights as having distinct and non-
positivist basis, not answering the foremost authoritative and distributive questions of rights 
in the manner of the UDHR and the ECtHR, left the positivist space for other political 
arguments to grow. The lack of ownership of rights recognised by Bill of Rights 
Commission, is not only ownership at a nationalistic level for lack of “Britishness”, there is a 
lack of the recognition of the ownership of rights at a more fundamental level. In not stating a 
universal and inalienable basis, the courts and wider society lack a foundation from which to 
build an understanding of the possession of human rights as different from rights conferred 
simply by law. A recognition of a deeper basis of rights, in accordance with the UN rights 
document’s recognition of dignity as the basis to which rights universally and inalienably 
attach, to answer the question of who has rights and why, is thus essential. Such a recognition 
is necessary to help change the understanding of rights at a fundamental level, to combat the 
current domestic conception of rights, by showing that the rights are not given or granted but 
are and were always possessed by individuals, and are now recognised and protected under 
the HRA. 
 
The Current Domestic Judicial Approach to the Basis of Rights  
 
In the absence of a revolutionary context or principled statement of the basis of rights, the 
majority of the UK’s judiciary have instead grounded the possession of rights in a positivist 
manner in an old common law conception of legal personhood. The universal and inalienable 
attachment of rights to the possession of human dignity, justifying their protection within UN 
rights documents, is almost universally unrecognised within the domestic application of the 
Convention rights. 
The British courts’ approach to the question of the essential characteristic for rights 
possession derives from the 17
th
 century definition of legal personhood.
34
 As in other courts, 
the legal status of the foetus has been a touchstone for this question.
35
 However, whereas 
other courts recognised the pivotal importance of this question as concerning the basis of 
rights possession, the ECtHR extending a margin of appreciation to it,
36
 the UK courts have 
not recognised its special importance in the application of human rights. The domestic courts 
have with few exceptions applied the historic approach, that a human has legal rights as a 
legal person once born alive,
37
 using this as the only justification for the possession of the 
Convention rights. 
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This focus on having been born and alive, as the basis of human rights possession, can be 
seen in judgments both before and under the HRA. Prior to the Act, it was present in the 
courts’ approach to the status of those in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) who are 
medically alive - having a functioning brain stem - but without consciousness or personality. 
In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland the House of Lords thus held that, separate from the moral 
question of what is meant by “life,” such an individual is a legal person.38 On this basis, they 
held that the common law principle of the sanctity of life backed by the internationally 
recognised right to life was applicable to Bland.
39
 Since the enactment of the HRA, this case 
law on the possession of legal rights has been reflected in the courts’ decisions on 
personhood for the purposes of the Convention rights. Relying on the common law, in 
relation to the status of life before birth, the courts have held human foetuses to be incapable 
of possessing a right to life under Article 2 because they could not be deemed to be 
“persons.”40 Similarly, in a case concerning the continued treatment of a PVS patient, the 
High Court applied Bland and held that as the patient was medically alive she was a person 
possessing Convention rights.
41
 Thus the courts have stuck closely to the previous common 
law, declining to distinguish the grounds of the possession of Convention rights from that of 
other legal rights. 
A reluctance on the part of the courts to engage with such a substantively contentious 
moral question is understandable, both the ECtHR and US Supreme Court took pains to avoid 
making an independent substantive moral decision. However, what makes the continued 
legalistic approach of the UK courts to the question of possession of rights distinct, is that it 
is not accompanied by non-positivist statements that human rights possession by legal 
persons fundamentally derives, universally and inalienably, from a more fundamental basis 
such as the possession of dignity. Although, like the HRA, the ECHR contains no explicit 
reference to dignity or other fundamental basis, the domestic courts unlike the ECtHR in 
Pretty have not transcended this to recognise rights possession as having a non-positivist 
fundamental basis. 
 
Domestic Dignity 
 
Prior to the HRA coming into force, there was little explicit mention of the concept of dignity 
in statute or case law.
42
 Since the Act’s enactment, references have increased with “judges, 
advocates and legislators…increasingly confident in referring to dignity.”43 However, in 
contrast to its foundational role within the UN rights treaties, very few members of the 
judiciary have made use of it as a foundational justification for their interpretations of 
Convention rights. In some of the most pivotal and controversial human rights cases of recent 
years dignity has not been mentioned at all; the decision in A v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department was reached without invoking the vindication of the fundamental dignity 
of the individual, infringed by indefinite detention without trial.
44
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Where dignity has been mentioned, the predominant domestic judicial use of it has been 
as a description of an element of the substantive protection given by a Convention rights, 
rather than as a justification recognising the universal and inalienable possession of 
Convention rights generally. Gay Moon and Robin Allen summarise this substantive 
application of dignity as requiring that a person not be “humiliated or treated without respect 
for his value as a person,”45 and Feldman describes it as concerned with protecting the 
inherent worth of being human and how people see themselves as humans (their sense of self-
worth).
46
 In Bland, in the context of interpreting the right to life, dignity was held by 
Hoffmann L.J. (as he then was) to be concerned with the prevention of demeaning or 
embarrassing treatment of another.
47
 As a member of the House of Lords in Campbell, he 
reaffirmed this view of dignity under the HRA in interpreting Article 8, stating that dignity is 
concerned with the “right to the esteem and respect of other people.”48 In his explorations of 
the concept of dignity, Munby L.J. has recognised this substantive conception of dignity, 
stating the protection of the human person against humiliation and debasement is the concern 
of “human dignity,”49 explicitly agreeing with Lord Hoffmann.50 
However, Munby LJ. and Baroness Hale are the domestic judges who alone have 
consistently gone beyond this limited substantive interpretive use of dignity, and recognised 
its importance as the basis justifying the general possession and protection of human rights.
51
 
Baroness Hale has applied the ECtHR’s statement in Pretty to this effect,52 and Munby LJ. 
has argued that, although dignity was not mentioned explicitly in the ECHR, it is implicit “in 
almost every one of the Convention's provisions.”53 Consistent with the use of dignity in the 
international rights context, they have held it to be concerned with the value or worth of the 
individual. In Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza Baroness Hale held that to treat someone as of 
lesser value than another person by discriminating against them was to fail to respect their 
dignity;
54
 she recognised that human rights are held by all persons because they are all of 
equal value, they all possess dignity, and thus discrimination in the respect accorded to them 
is a violation of the basis on which the rights are held.
55
 Although Munby L.J. has 
acknowledged the substantive conception of dignity,
56
 he has himself conceptualised dignity 
in a way consistent with a position as the wider justificatory basis of rights, by arguing that 
respect for dignity requires the recognition that a human being is more than a machine, that 
their greater intangible humanity must be respected.
57
  
The uses of both conceptions of dignity, the substantive and justificatory, and the 
distinctions between them, can be clearly seen in the House of Lords judgement in Limbuala. 
Here, Lords Brown and Hope both invoked dignity in the substantive sense as part of 
defining “degrading treatment” for the purposes of Article 3: treatment of individuals which 
humiliates or debases a particular group would be an “affront to human dignity” violation of 
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Article 3.
58
 However, Baroness Hale recognised dignity as of deeper and more fundamental 
significance. She argued that both Articles 2 and 3 in a more general sense, reflecting and 
protecting “the dignity of each individual human being, no matter how unpopular or 
unworthy she may be,”59 recognising the universality and inalienability of the dignity to 
which rights possession attaches. The approach of Lords Brown and Hope is not without 
support within ECtHR jurisprudence.
60
 However, only Baroness Hale invoked the wider 
recognition that the ECtHR has given to dignity, as the “very essence of the Convention,”61 
repeating her justificatory approach in Godin-Mendoza. 
Although the HRA does not recognise a basis in dignity for rights, the statutory 
instruction to the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, gives it the task of fostering a 
society which respects “the dignity and worth of each individual.”62 Thus there is some 
parliamentary support for recognising the connection between the worth of the individual, 
their possession of dignity, and their possession of rights. 
Thus, some members of the judiciary are using and developing a conception of dignity as 
the basis of Convention rights. But the recognition in these statements of dignity’s 
foundational nature, the invocation of dignity as the basis of rights justifying decisions on 
their existence, application and interpretation, as opposed to giving substance to their 
interpretation, is very rare, not routine. This deficiency is not an insubstantial formal issue. 
The absence of such a fundamental basis in judicial rights decisions, one that gives the 
recognition of their universal and inalienable possession found within the major rights 
treaties, is of pivotal importance to the coherent justification and consequent acceptance of 
the Convention rights. The current approach is out of step with the internationally recognised 
nature of rights stated within the UDHR, and contributes to maintaining of a positivist 
conception of human rights in the UK, propagating Bentham and Burke’s rights hostility. 
 
A More Dignified Approach to Rights 
 
There are two ways in which the UK legal order can engage with the fundamental question of 
the basis of rights, and contribute to redressing the mischaracterisation and misperception of 
the nature of the Convention rights, as positivist rather than universally and inalienably 
possessed. These alternate and complimentary means are: a judicial willingness to invoke 
dignity as a justification for their application and interpretation of Convention rights, and the 
inclusion of statements of a fundamental principled basis in the preamble to any future British 
Bill of Rights.  
 
Judicial Engagement  
  
A broad judicial re-characterisation of the underlying basis of the Convention rights in the 
UK, and rights protection generally, as grounded in the protection of dignity, is a means of 
recognising and communicating their universal and inalienable nature that is the foundation 
of the UN and ECHR schemes of rights protection. This does not require an alteration of the 
substance of decisions reached and to be reached under the HRA, for it involves the 
invocation of dignity as a justification for rights interpretation generally, not as a tool of 
construction giving substantive content to specific rights or to determine the scope of their 
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application. Nonetheless its effect would be profound, it would explain the fundamental, 
universal, inherent and inalienable nature of the rights, breaking from positivist Benthamite 
and Burkian conception of rights that currently permeates the domestic understanding and 
application of rights. The practicality of this justificatory use within the UK legal order, is 
shown by the judgments of Baroness Hale, Munby LJ. and the judiciary of other legal 
systems. 
This use of dignity as a justification for interpretation, rather than as a substantive tool to 
give rights content, circumvents the traditional but cogent criticisms of the principle of 
dignity and its judicial use. Chris McCrudden described dignity within rights documents as a 
“place holder,” a term encompassing a wide range of substantive concepts and characteristics 
capable of forming the basis of rights,
63
 and argued that to attempt to define this basis by 
choosing amongst these concepts and characteristics involves engagement with substantive 
moral questions on which there is wide disagreement.
64
 It was in recognition of the 
divisiveness of this question the ECtHR refused to define the basis on which the Convention 
rights were held, invoking the margin of appreciation.
65
 Feldman has additionally argued that 
substantive judicial interpretive use of dignity risks shifting the debate from the meaning of 
the right to the meaning of dignity.
66
 Following from both these concerns is that the open 
textured nature of dignity, creates the potential that, if used by the judiciary to interpret rights, 
judges will apply their own morality to give it content.
67
 Similarly, as dignity is open to 
multiple possible and conflicting conceptions of the particular characteristic to which rights 
attach and of human worth, this creates the potential for inconsistency when it is applied and 
in the conclusions reached using it.
68
 This might render the legitimacy of dignity based 
judgements questionable
69
 given that certainty is an important element of the rule of law.
70
 
However, these cogent and legitimate arguments against dignity as a tool for substantive 
rights interpretation are not applicable to its judicial use as an underpinning justification for 
rights, their interpretation and application. The use of dignity I advocate does not require the 
judiciary to give a meaning to dignity beyond that which states have given to it as a place 
holder within the UN rights treaties – what McCrudden defines as the agreed “minimum 
core” of dignity71 – as recognising that there is some deeper non-positivist foundation for 
human rights in the value of the human person which makes them universal and inalienable. 
This approach does not involve the substantive determination of the nature of the basis of this 
underlying value to which rights attach. It does not involve the substantive interpretive 
application of dignity to give content to the Convention rights, not even to the extent that 
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dignity has already been used to interpret Article 3 ECHR by the ECtHR and some members 
of our domestic judiciary. 
The effect of this justificatory invocation of dignity, in this most fundamental but open of 
senses, will be to contribute to a change in the domestic understanding of rights, not their 
substantive content. With dignity is a place holder, the place it holds within the international 
human rights law to which the UK is committed, is for the recognition of rights as universally 
and inalienably possessed, not as merely created by positivist substantive law. This 
recognition is largely absent within UK law but can be furthered by the judicial justificatory 
use of dignity. Acknowledging the Convention rights as having this fundamental basis is not 
inconsistent Parliamentary Sovereignty. It is a central tenant of the UDHR’s statement of the 
universality and inalienability of rights to dignity, that their possession at a moral level is not 
affected by the extent to which they are respected by the substantive law of the legal system. 
Thus the moral authority of rights, which derives from their fundamental basis of rights, 
exists and justifies the rights, independent of their legal relationship with other laws within 
the constitutional hierarchy.
72
 
Baroness Hale and Munby LJ. have shown that this use of dignity is possible in 
judgments under the HRA. Practical support for its wider justificatory use, as well as being 
grounded in role dignity plays within the UN rights documents and the recognition given to it 
by the ECtHR, can be found in the domestic common law and that of Canada. The Canadian 
courts, cousins of the British common law, have taken this step of recognising dignity as 
underlying the rights in their Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCFR).
73
 Significantly, as 
with the HRA, there is no mention of the dignity in the Charter. The HRA is thus not unique 
in lacking  a statement of a fundamental principled basis for rights, as already noted, the 
ECHR contains no explicit reference to such a basis. However, in R v Oakes the Canadian 
Supreme Court, like the ECtHR in Pretty, felt the necessity and proved the possibility of 
recognising from the Charter alone, that the legal protection of human rights is nonetheless 
grounded in and justified by the protection of human dignity.
74
 
In Canada some of the courts have used the reference to dignity in the preamble of the 
1960 Canadian Bill of Rights to support this approach to the interpretation of the Charter 
rights.
75
 However, in several cases Canadian judges have based their invocation of dignity in 
the common law as well as their Bill of Rights.
76
 In R v Stillman Cory J., although applying 
dignity in the more substantive sense, stated that “[t]raditionally, the Common Law and 
Canadian society have recognised the fundamental importance of the innate dignity of the 
individual.”77 Similarly, R v S (R.J.) recognised that dignity was a fundamental value which 
underlay not only the CCFR but also the common law.
78
 The experience in Canada thus 
indicates that, although a principle of dignity is not explicitly stated within the HRA, this is 
not a bar to its judicial invocation.  
An implicit respect for dignity can be found from within the domestic common law, as 
underlying the protections of the individual by the common law which would now fall under 
the protection of the Convention rights. Munby L.J. states that the recognition of inherent 
human value that dignity embodies “is a core value of the common law, long pre-dating the 
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Convention.”79 In Burke he argued that concern for it underlies the pre-HRA case law on the 
treatment of those in a persistent vegetative state, and the substantive interpretive uses of 
dignity in interpretation in cases such as Bland.
80
 Similarly, David Feldman argues that the 
pre-2000 case law requiring respect for patient control over their medical treatment protected 
dignity, by prohibiting people from being treated without regard for their opinions as if they 
were of no worth.
81
 Consistent with this, he also argues that the decision in R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department Ex p JCWI protected dignity, by upholding the fundamental 
value of the individual which underlies the protection given by the ECHR.
82
 Thus even prior 
to the enactment of the HRA the worth and value of the person was already a concern 
underlying the Common Law, and now supports its more open protection and recognition 
through a judicial rights decisions justified by the principle of dignity.  
Recently, and encouragingly, in the context of the Refugee Convention 1951, members 
of our Supreme Court invoked dignity in a justificatory manner.  In HJ (Iran) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department Lord Hope DPSC noted the importance of the UDHR 
preamble and its reference to the dignity of individual in “understanding” the human rights 
protection given by that Convention, but did not apply a specific interpretation of it.
83
 Dyson 
SCJ, in giving the judgement for the court in RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees intervening), building on 
his invocation of dignity as the basis of the Refugee Convention in HJ (Iran),
84
 relied on the 
use of dignity in the UDHR and Council Directive 2004/83/EC, to hold that “the right to 
dignity is the foundation of all freedoms” protected by international human rights law.85   
Thus, the justificatory use of dignity when applying the HRA by some members of our 
judiciary, and Canadian case law, demonstrate that the wider domestic grounding of the 
interpretation and application of the rights in dignity to convey their fundamental nature is 
possible. That there is a positivist misunderstanding of the nature of rights within British 
society shows it is necessary. If this use of dignity in human rights were generally adopted, it 
would embody and contribute to a better national understanding of the nature of human 
rights,
86
 for the deeper basis of rights as universally and inalienably possessed would be 
explicitly described. 
 
A British Bill of Rights 
 
The opportunity missed in the drafting of the HRA without a statement of basic principles, 
and the importance of the preambular statement, is only now becoming apparent. The lack of 
rights ownership by the British people that this has contributed to was recognised by the 
majority of the Commission on a Bill of Rights to be so significant that it forms the main 
justification for its call for a British Bill of Rights.
87
 
Lacking the experiences of France and the US to give a sense of rights ownership as 
universally and inalienably possessed, without a similar impetus for the creation of rights 
protection within the UK, the need for their true nature to be acknowledged though 
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recognition of a basis in dignity is all the more pressing. Establishing the nature of human 
rights is one of the primary functions performed by the preambles of UN rights treaties and 
national constitutions, by including no such statements within the Human Rights Act, an 
opportunity was missed to describe the nature of the rights brought within UK law and to 
shape their public perception.  
The minority report of Helena Kennedy and Philippe Sands argued that the evidence 
gathered showed no lack of ownership of rights in Scotland and Wales, or Northern Ireland.
88
 
However, this is consistent with, not dismissive of, a lack of general English ownership, for 
the creation of domestic Human Rights in these other parts of the UK coincided with 
significant constitutional changes. Although not on the scale of those in France and the US 
and, with the exception of Northern Ireland, not arising from a broader context of previous 
rights infringements, their acceptance of rights protection coheres with other nations’ 
experiences of human rights protection as a significant departure from the previous laws. In 
England there was no such perception and without the inclusion of a principled basis for the 
rights there was nothing to suggest that they were a new form of law, with a deeper non-
positivist justification.
89
  
It was suggested to the Commission that the lack of ownership in a nationalistic sense 
could to some extent be addressed by a formulation of the rights that showed them to be 
based in our own constitutional history, such as the Magna Carta.
90
 However, an 
understanding and acceptance of the nature of rights in line with international human rights 
law can only be achieved by showing them to be possessed universally and inalienably, a 
recognition a principled basis in dignity can help to achieve. As Elliot argues, a bill of rights 
which does not engage with the question of the fundamental nature of rights will be 
incoherent and vacuous.
91
 A foundation in dignity answers this need for a fundamental basis 
for rights possession, as recognised to be in the foremost rights treaties. It would counteract 
that Benthamite and Burkian conception of hollow positivist rights the HRA and the courts 
have adopted.  
This recognition of a basis in dignity would also have the advantage of addressing the 
public concern of rights without responsibilities noted by the Commission.
92
 As a basis for 
rights it can explain that “the nature of human rights [is] that they exist for all human beings 
equally, without reference to whether they are ‘deserving’….”93 In this context the 
Commission did recognise, although without defining the principled basis,
94
 that a 
declaratory preamble might be a means within a future Bill of Rights to attach “importance 
…to the mutual ties and obligations on which societies depend and of assisting its broad 
acceptance.”95 A statement of a basis in dignity can perform this function, answering the 
question of the nature of rights the Commission did not. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The question of the basis of rights, the answers to the authoritative and distributive questions 
of who has rights and why, are of fundamental importance in stating their nature and 
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communicating society’s conception of rights. Although courts confronted with the question 
of the basis of rights possession shy away from stating a detailed basis, they and national and 
international rights documents have recognised the importance of this question and of 
addressing it. Under the leading rights treats of which the UK is a signatory, the basis that 
forms the foundation for rights protection is the dignity of the individual to which the rights 
are recognised as universally and inalienably attaching. 
The lack of engagement with this question in the UK, when compared to the prominent 
statements of principled bases for rights in other rights documents, has had a fundamental 
practical impact on domestic rights protection. The absence of a clear coherent statement of a 
deeper theoretical foundation for rights has contributed to the lack of acceptance or 
ownership of the Convention rights, by leaving a positivist space where the nature of human 
rights is not recognised as distinct. The Bill of Rights Commission correctly identified this 
problem of the lack of acceptance of rights, but failed to realise a fundamental underlying 
factor contributing to it. A coherently justified interpretation and public acceptance of the 
Convention rights requires that a fundamental basis for the rights, embodying and depicting 
their universal and inherent nature, be recognised in the UK. If human rights are to be 
accepted in a manner consistent with the characterisation of their nature by in international 
and other national rights documents and discourse, any new Bill of Rights must state a 
fundamental basis. 
However, a legislative solution is not essential. Case law analysis demonstrates that our 
judiciary have thus far almost entirely missed the opportunity their position gives them, to 
make clear the true nature of rights as recognised within the leading human rights treaties. 
Both the ECtHR and Canadian courts have acknowledged the fundamental nature of rights 
possession, though recognising the principle of dignity as their basis and using it to justify 
their interpretations. By following their example, and departing from the 17th century 
positivist grounding for rights generally applied so far, our courts can assist in increasing the 
acceptance and ownership of rights in the UK. Through greater and consistent use of the 
principle of dignity to justify their decisions, they can redress the missed opportunity to state 
a deeper basis for the rights within the HRA. The judicial use of dignity is regarded as 
problematic: where philosophers fear to tread in defining dignity should judges or legislative 
drafters rush in? Under the approach advocated here they need not do so. They need go no 
further than the use of dignity within rights treaties, but for our courts and for the 
understanding of rights in the UK this would be a fundamental step. 
The absence of the statement of a fundamental basis of rights and the lack of the 
recognition of its importance’s is an understandable consequence of the UK’s constitutional 
history. Both the courts and Parliament can have a role in redressing this critical flaw in our 
rights protection. Until they do, the justification and acceptance of human rights law in the 
UK will continue to be fundamentally lacking. 
 
 
